Published papers belonging to confidence project include:
- A non-technical introduction and philosophical defense: Confidence in Beliefs and Rational Decision Making.
- Technical decision-theory papers: Confidence and Decision and Incomplete Preferences and Confidence.
- A paper on uncertainty reporting and evidence: Confidence in belief, weight of evidence and uncertainty reporting.
- Papers on applications to climate decision and uncertainty reporting (with R. Bradley and C. Helgeson): Climate Change Assessments: Confidence, Probability and Decision and Combining probability with qualitative degree-of-certainty metrics in assessment.
- Normatively, the strongest argument against the confidence approach (and any non-Bayesian approach) comes in the form of a set of dynamic arguments. I argue that they are based on a (simple) mistake and debunk them here: Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal.
- Extensions to confidence in preferences (other papers focus on confidence in beliefs): Confidence in Preferences.
For work in progress, see here.
This page contains brief introductions to some of this research.