Decision Making and Imprecise Beliefs

March 17, 2017

Beliefimg_7251s, of course, play a central role in decision making under uncertainty. There has been increasing attention on the issues thrown up by imprecision in beliefs or preferences, both in the economic and psychological literature. What effects does the lack of precise probabilistic beliefs, or different sorts of uncertainty have on preferences? How does imprecision translate into choice? How does imprecision affect belief formation? How can it be elicited?

The objective of this workshop, the fifth in a series, is to bring together researchers working on such topics, in both theoretical and experimental perspectives, and to foster discussion and exchange.

This page contains recordings of the talks and discussions that took place at this workshop.

Morning Session

Peter Wakker (Erasmus University)

Savage for Dummies and Experts

Glenn Harrison (Georgia State University)

Recovering Subjective Probability Distributions

Edi Karni (Johns Hopkins)

Elicitation of Second Order Beliefs

David Tannenbaum (University of Utah)

Judgement Extremity and Accuracy under Epistemic vs. Aleatory Uncertainty

Afternoon Session

Chen Li (Ermasmus University)

Signal perception and Belief Formation

Chris Starmer(University of Nottingham)

On Preference Imprecision

Fabio Maccheroni (University of Bocconi)

Forced Choices

John Hey (University of York)

When and How to Satisfice, An Experimental Investigation