Tag: uncertainty

Itzhak Gilboa

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Economics and Decision Sciences

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Itzhak Gilboa is a Professor of Economics and Decision Sciences at HEC, Paris, and Professor at the Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University. He works in decision theory and other fields in economic theory such as game theory and social choice.  His main interest is in decision under uncertainty, focusing on the definition of probability, notions of rationality, non-Bayesian decision models, and related issues. He holds the AXA-HEC Chair for Decision Science.

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Craig Fox

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Management and Psychology

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Craig Fox is the Harold Williams Chair and Professor of Management at the UCLA Anderson School of Management, professor of psychology at the UCLA College of Letters and Sciences and professor of medicine in the UCLA Geffen School. His research focuses on decision behavior, especially under conditions of risk and uncertainty. He co-founded the Behavioral Science & Policy Association.

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Richard Bradley

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Philosophy

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Richard Bradley is Professor of Philosophy at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He works broadly in decision theory and related fields such as formal epistemology and semantics. His research interests include decision making under uncertainty and the role of hypothetical reasoning in reaching judgements about what to do, the nature of the intentional attitudes, belief and preference revision, social value and choice, as well as the nature of chance and our attitudes to it, and decision making under severe uncertainty. He is leader of the Managing Severe Uncertainty project at the LSE.

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Confidence as crucial for rational belief and decision

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The standard, Bayesian account of rational belief and decision in terms of probability is often argued to be unable to cope properly with severe uncertainty, of the sort ubiquitous in some areas of policy making. Confidence in Beliefs and Rational Decision Making (to appear in the JUly 2019 issue of the journal Economics and Philosophy; pre-print available here) asks what should replace it as a guide for rational decision making. It provides the most comprehensive defense to date of an account of rational belief and decision that reserves a role for the decision maker’s confidence in beliefs (previously endorsed here and here). Beyond being able to cope with severe uncertainty, the account has strong normative credentials on the main fronts typically evoked as relevant for rational belief and decision. It fares particularly well in comparison to other prominent non-Bayesian models.